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Abstract
Leveraging connectivity and interoperability of medical
devices promises a great benefit for patient safety and effec-
tiveness of medical services. However, safety issues arising
from coordination failures between networked medical de-
vices pose a significant challenge to achieve such vision. In
this paper, we propose an organ-based semi-autonomous hi-
erarchical control structure as an architectural design prin-
ciple to make integrated medical systems more resilient and
effective against communication failures. The proposed de-
sign principle also enables the development of tools sup-
porting rapid hierarchical composition of organ-based clus-
ters and the verification of safety assertions. Our simulation
study shows that our approach can provide the safety while
minimally interrupting ongoing medical services in the face
of network failures.
1 Introduction
In medical patient care environments, there are grow-
ing demands to leverage device connectivity and interop-
erability in order to improve the effectiveness of medi-
cal services and patient safety [17]. The increasing num-
ber of medical devices are meant to cooperatively auto-
mate medical workflows, implement smart alarms with inte-
grated patient/treatment information and contexts, and pro-
vide safety interlocks that prevent human errors in deal-
ing with networked devices. Recently, several initiatives
have been launched, envisioning the efficient collaboration
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among medical devices while they reduce accidents caused
by human errors [9]. One representative effort is ASTM
Integrated Clinical Environment (ICE) standard [1], devel-
oped by the Medical Device Plug-and-Play (MD PnP) Inter-
operability program [8]. The ICE standard aims to provide
standardized integration of data and devices to enable real-
time control decision support and safety interlocks, thus en-
suring patient safety. Several prototype designs and imple-
mentations of ICE have been reported [6, 13, 12].
However, one of the biggest challenges of the proposed
ICE lies in guaranteeing the safety within the Plug-and-Play
environment. If not properly designed, the introduction of
the ICE supervisory control and the networking of medical
devices could significantly increase the complexity of the
whole system, tending to make the system more vulnera-
ble to potential errors and safety hazards. Unlike standalone
medical devices, whose safety is guaranteed by regulatory
agencies such as FDA (Food and Drug Administration) after
rigorous tests and verification, the ICE platform itself can-
not be certified for its safety since it is, inevitably, a generic
computing platform executing control functions of poten-
tially arbitrary combinations of medical devices; the FDA is
unable to certify computing platforms executing unknown
combinations and configurations of devices at the time of
certification. Therefore, the hardware and software archi-
tecture of ICE should be carefully designed to guarantee
safety despite potential failures in underlying platforms and
at any of the network communication points. For example,
if a critical command from the ICE supervisory control is
lost because of unreliable network connectivity, the ICE en-
vironment and design should have a mechanism to guaran-
tee safety, such as device interlocking, despite the lost com-
mand.
In our previous work, we presented a safe supervi-
sory framework, called Network-Aware Supervisory Sys-
tems (NASS) [12]. NASS is a first successful protocol that
addresses open-loop safety issues of ICE. We demonstrated
NASS’s open-loop safety mechanism under a simplified tra-
cheal airway-laser surgery scenario. However, the effec-
tiveness issue has yet to be addressed. By effectiveness,
we mean supporting the execution of medical procedures
as planned with little or no interruption. NASS assumes
a two-level hierarchy ICE environment that consists of an
ICE supervisor and all the devices. Under this communi-
cation architecture, when the network fails, no coordination
between any devices are possible.
In this paper, we propose organ-based semi-autonomous
and hierarchical control approach to support organ-based
management of networked medical devices. Our goal is
to provide architectural design principles and supporting
mechanisms and tools that can be applied consistently to
build safe and effective integrated networked medical de-
vices. In our approach, devices are grouped into semi-
autonomous clusters to support organ-specific homeosta-
sis 1. Each organ-based cluster is semi-autonomous since
it can make independent control decisions under certain
boundaries. For example, a ventilator device in the pul-
monary cluster can adjust its oxygen pumping level within
certain thresholds to maintain the homeostasis of the pul-
monary/lung function of the human body. If homeostasis of
an organ cannot be maintained by the local control of the
cluster, an exception is raised to the higher ICE supervisory
control device. The responsibility of the higher-level super-
visory control is to handle such exceptional inter-organ clus-
ter situations with help from health-care providers. This ar-
chitectural principle makes the networked medical systems
more safe and effective against failures since each cluster
can still function and enforce per-cluster safety constraints
even if the cluster loses connectivity and control from the
remaining system.
Patient safety involves many dimensions, including po-
tential drug interactions, allergies, and idiosyncratic reac-
tion to given medical treatments. However, in this paper, we
focus on safe and effective integration of networked medical
devices. The contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) Architectural design principles: We provide design
principles for safe and effective integration of networked
medical devices. The design principles provide guidance in
the choice of composition of devices, and the placement of
functions, considering safety, scalability, and effectiveness.
2) Supporting safety mechanism and tools: We propose
an open-loop safety mechanism to support safety against
network failures. We also provide a toolkit in Simulink
to support systematic application of the proposed design
principles and open-loop safety mechanism. The toolkit
provides device models, physiological organ models, and
verification patterns for systematic composition, simulation,
and verification of networked medical devices.
1Human homeostasis is the ability or tendency of an organism or a cell
to maintain internal equilibrium by adjusting its physiological processes.
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3) Effectiveness evaluation: Through a simulation study,
the effectiveness of our approach is evaluated. We compare
an architecture, which follows the proposed design princi-
ples, with baseline approaches. The evaluation results show
that our approach can guarantee the safety while minimally
interrupting the ongoing medical services in the face of net-
work failures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we present the background on ICE in the context of
airway-laser surgery. In Section 3, we present the organ-
based clustering design principle and its rationale. Addi-
tional design principles and supporting mechanisms are dis-
cussed in detail in Section 4. The supporting composition
and verification tool is presented in Section 5. In Section 6,
we discuss evaluation results. Related work is presented in
Section 7, and Section 8 concludes the paper and discusses
future work.
2 Clinical Background and Fault Model
Figure 1 shows the main components of the ICE (Inte-
grated Clinical Environment) architecture proposed by the
MD PnP project [1]. Medical devices are plugged into the
ICE manager to build a virtualized integrated device. The
ICE manager is a computer system that is responsible for su-
pervising attached devices. The supervisor is the key com-
ponent of the ICE manager, and automates medical work-
flows, implements smart alarms, and provides safety inter-
locks that prevent human errors. Hereafter, we use the term
supervisor interchangeably with ICE manager, if not speci-
fied explicitly. The adapter at each medical device is a thin
network device connecting the medical device to the ICE
manager, either in wire or wireless. It should be noted that
the architecture in Figure 1 is a logical view and does not
impose a specific physical inter-networking topology.
Table 1. Potential safety hazards in airway
laser surgery
Hazards Safety constraints
Surgical Laser device and ventilator should be interlocked.
fire When the laser is enabled, oxygen supply should
be blocked, vice versa.
Brain Oxygen supply of ventilator cannot be blocked
damage for more than 4.5 minutes.
Fluid IV fluid infusion should be stopped, if changes
overload in BP and HR are beyond thresholds for some time.
In this paper, we are only concerned about coordination
failures, in which networked medical devices cannot pro-
vide intended functions and safety due to the loss of coordi-
nation between devices. In the ICE architecture, we identify
two sources of a coordination failure: a failure of ICE su-
pervisor and a communication channel failure. Since each
medical device is certified by regulatory agencies, such as
FDA, we do not consider failures of devices. In this pa-
per, we treat a failure of ICE supervisor as a communication
channel failure between the devices connected to the super-
visory control. Byzantine faults are not considered in our
fault model.
2.1 Airway Laser Surgery
A simplified version of airway-laser surgery was used in
NASS to demonstrate its safety guarantees. Throughout this
paper, we also extend the NASS scenario as a clinical exam-
ple to illustrate the safety and effectiveness of the proposed
approach.
An airway-laser surgery has the potential danger of an
accidental fire if the laser is activated while high oxygen
concentration is supplied by the ventilator. Whenever the
laser is being activated, a human operator must block (or
significantly reduce) the air path from the oxygen concen-
trate, first. However, in our simplified patient model, if oxy-
gen is reduced for more than about 4.5 minutes and the
blood oxygen saturation (SpO2) level is below 30%, the
brain of the patient might be damaged. In traditional oper-
ating room environments, nurses and surgeons are supposed
to be aware of such potential fire and low-oxygen problems
[3]. Nevertheless, an unfortunate 100 fires are reported an-
nually in the US due to the human errors during airway-laser
surgeries.
For discussion in this paper, the patient undergoing tra-
cheal airway-laser surgery is given as being elderly with a
history of congestive heart failure (CHF). During airway-
laser surgery, IV (intravenous) fluid, such as normal saline
(NS), is commonly injected to deliver medications, or to
prevent dehydration during the procedure. However, the
volume of IV fluid should be carefully controlled since over-
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Figure 2. Organ-based clustering and hierar-
chical control structure.
infusion of IV fluid can cause fluid retention, which can then
trigger congestive heart failure, particularly in a patient with
a history of heart disease. If the changes of blood pressure
and heart rate are beyond thresholds set for a patient, then
the IV fluid infusion should be stopped. This is just one of
many common complications in ICU (intensive-care unit).
Table 1 summarizes potential safety hazards that must be
closely monitored by caregivers during the initial airway-
laser surgery model, now with the addition of devices to
monitor BP, HR, and IV fluid infusion. In such a highly
error-prone traditional surgical environment, the supervi-
sory control of ICE is expected to increase the safety. For
example, the ICE supervisor can enforce the interlock be-
tween laser and ventilator automatically during surgery.
3 Organ-based Clustering Principle
The prevailing idea behind the previous prototypes and
design of ICE architecture is the composition of an arbitrary
set of medical devices into virtual medical devices. Hence,
a flat structure, such as shown in Figure 1, has been as-
sumed and it does not restrict any inter-connection and com-
munication patterns. However, our organ-based clustering
principle constrains the communication pattern to be clus-
tered according to their physiological correlation and organ-
centric human homeostasis. Figure 2 shows an example of
an organ-based clustering and hierarchical control architec-
ture. In this example, for instance, a ventilator, a blood
oxygen saturation (SpO2) sensor, and a fraction of inspired
oxygen (FiO2) sensor are all strongly tied to the respiratory
system of the human body, and, hence they are grouped into
the pulmonary cluster. Similarly, clusters for cardiac, kid-
ney, therapeutic devices, and others might be identified.
The organ-based clustering approach has several advan-
tages. From a medical perspective, human organs are
loosely coupled to each other since each of them shows
strong homeostatic behaviors. For example, the homeostasis
of the cardiac system can maintain its blood pumping func-
tion against a modest fluid overdose and hardly affect pul-
monary functions until the onset of congestive heart failure.
From an engineering perspective, clustering is a primary
way to control the complexity of large-scale distributed sys-
tems; clustering provides high scalability, fault isolation,
timeliness, and the separation of concerns. With clustering,
we can process tight and short timescale dynamics inside a
cluster, while loose and long timescale dynamics between
clusters are handled via inter-cluster coordination.
4 Organ-based Semi-Autonomous Hierarchi-
cal Control Architecture
In this section, we first describe a set of design prin-
ciples that guide the development of organ-based semi-
autonomous and hierarchical ICE implementation. We then
describe supporting mechanisms and tools for the design
principles.
4.1 Design Principles and Architecture
The organ-based clustering principle structures the de-
sign space for ICE implementation, but is not itself an ar-
chitecture. The organ-based semi-autonomous and hierar-
chical control architecture is an ICE architecture based on
the organ-based clustering principle and 3 additional design
principles described here.
The first principle expresses the Semi-Autonomous Hi-
erarchical Control property of the architecture: Each
organ-based cluster of devices has a semi-autonomous
closed control loop supporting the homeostasis of the organ
and the upper level supervisory control is only responsible
for inter-cluster coordination. This principle makes each
cluster operate as a semi-autonomous unit, comprising sens-
ing and treatment for the corresponding organ. For example,
in the pulmonary cluster, when a patient is on the ventila-
tor, an attending physician will set a lower-bound threshold
on the blood oxygen level (SpO2) and upper-bound thresh-
old on the ventilator control variables such as pressure, tidal
volume, and oxygen concentration (FiO2). The ventilator
controller can adjust the control variables to achieve tar-
get SpO2 level providing that no control thresholds are ex-
ceeded. We call this type of control semi-autonomous con-
trol because the pulmonary cluster can independently ad-
just control variables as long as no control thresholds are
violated. Due to the homeostatic property of human phys-
iology, the treatment at one cluster has weak influence on
other clusters. This implies that organ-specific physiolog-
ical model and corresponding controller can be designed
in an independent and modular manner. Unlike homeosta-
sis of separate organs, which can be managed by semi-
autonomous computerized controllers, a diagnosis and treat-
ment of symptoms involving multiple organs can hardly be
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automated by computers and it still belongs to the realm of
human physicians. A situation requiring inter-organ coordi-
nation should be notified to the upper level supervisory con-
trol via exceptions. The only supported inter-organ coordi-
nation, in this paper, is the interlocking between the devices
belonging to different clusters. Automated decision-making
at the supervisory control is out of scope of this paper.
The second principle expresses the Encapsulated Safety
property of an organ-based cluster: Each cluster is respon-
sible for specific safety constraints, and needs to guarantee
the safety constraints even under network failures or loss
of external control. Specific safety constraints are encapsu-
lated to a certain cluster and transparently handled by the
cluster. For example, the brain damage from reduced oxy-
gen supply is prevented by the pulmonary cluster by limiting
the blocking time of oxygen supply. Since each organ-based
cluster has autonomy, a cluster can function as far as the de-
vices in the cluster can communicate and make coordinated
decisions. For instance, even if the cardiac cluster is dis-
connected from the ICE supervisor, the cluster can maintain
proper level of blood pressure and heart rates by adjusting
the IV fluid volume within the thresholds. If the thresholds
are violated when the cluster is disconnected from the up-
per level supervisor, the cluster should raise a local alarm to
draw attention from surgeons.
The final principle expresses the Cluster Header and
Proxy Control property: For each cluster, a device is des-
ignated as a cluster header, which is computationally pow-
erful enough to manage autonomy of the cluster. If there
is no such device, a proxy control for the cluster should
be placed at the upper level supervisory control device. In
actual placement of control functions, one of the devices
should be a focal point, or cluster header, that interconnects
devices in the cluster. For example, for a pulmonary clus-
ter, a ventilator device can be designated as a cluster header.
If the ventilator either does not support plug-and-play in-
terface or is not computationally powerful enough, a proxy
controller for the pulmonary cluster should be placed at the
Table 2. Safety levels of a cluster
SLsys Closed-loop control situations.
SLclst Cluster C is disconnected from the supervisor.
But, C’s devices can communicate locally.
SLvclst A network failure occurs inside cluster C.
Per-cluster contingency plans are executed
for a limited duration. After the time limit
C’s devices switch to default safety modes.
SLdev Each device in C is in default safe mode.
ICE supervisor, and the devices of the cluster need to be di-
rectly plugged into the ICE supervisor. This compromises
safety since faults at the ICE supervisor might also affect
the underlying clusters.
Figure 3 shows a hierarchical ICE architecture designed
according to the design principles. In the pulmonary clus-
ter, a semi-autonomous closed loop is formed between the
ventilator and the monitored SpO2 level to aid the home-
ostasis of the organ. The safety constraints, such as pre-
venting brain damage, are encapsulated in the pulmonary
cluster. Once the cluster’s safety constraints are verified,
the cluster can be reused in various clinical scenarios in a
modular manner. In the airway laser surgery scenario, the
laser device in the therapeutic cluster is interlocked with the
ventilator in the pulmonary cluster. Therefore, a coordina-
tion control logic should be placed at the ICE supervisor to
ensure the interlocking. In this case, the pulmonary clus-
ter’s autonomy is compromised to support the inter-cluster
interlocking property.
4.2 Closed-loop and Open-loop Safety
An architecture of networked medical devices designed
according to the proposed design principles might include
two types of control loops: intra-cluster semi-autonomous
control loops and inter-cluster control loops. Intra-cluster
control loops exist at each organ-based cluster and supports
homeostasis of the corresponding organ. On the contrary,
inter-cluster control loops exist at the ICE system level and
coordinate multiple cooperating clusters 2. If all network
connections along a control loop are intact, we call this sit-
uation closed-loop control. Under closed-loop control, the
devices in the control loop can communicate and make co-
ordinated actions to effectively enforce safety constraints.
This level of safety is called closed-loop safety. At the de-
sign time, the closed-loop safety should be checked by com-
posing component devices’ models and physiological mod-
els.
However, when any communication links along the con-
2As mentioned earlier, most inter-cluster coordination requires human
physicians’ involvement. In this paper, we only consider interlocking be-
tween clusters for inter-cluster coordinations.
trol loops are broken, the safety assertions verified under
closed-loop control situations are not valid anymore. When
a control loop is broken due to network failures, this situa-
tion is called open-loop control. The level of safety provided
under this situation is called open-loop safety. Open-loop
control situations might happen either at inter-cluster con-
trol loops or intra-cluster control loops. In the proposed ar-
chitecture, inter-cluster network failures do not affect semi-
autonomous control loops embedded in each organ-based
cluster. Hence, the clusters can still provide per-cluster
safety. For instance, the pulmonary cluster can still pre-
vent brain damage even under inter-cluster network failures.
However, when an intra-cluster network failure occurs, the
organ-based semi-autonomous control loop is broken and
encapsulated per-cluster safety constraints cannot be guar-
anteed.
Table 2 summarizes the safety levels of a cluster un-
der closed-loop and open-loop control situations. SLsys
represents closed loop control situations. The remaining
three safety levels represent open-loop control situations un-
der different conditions of network failures. Under SLdev
safety level, all devices stay in their own default safety
modes; e.g, the laser device is disabled and the ventilator
is activated. This is the most restricting open-loop con-
trol situation. While safe, it is also least effective since
a surgery must be stopped. SLclst is an open-loop safety
level, in which inter-cluster network failures have occurred,
but the cluster’s devices can communicate with each other
locally. Therefore, in SLclst safety level, the encapsu-
lated per-cluster safety constraints can be effectively pro-
vided according to the semi-autonomous clustering princi-
ple. SLvclst is a transient open-loop safety level supporting
encapsulated per-cluster safety constraints for a limited time
despite intra-cluster network failures. For SLvclst, contin-
gency plans, which are discussed in Section 4.2.1, are ex-
ploited to make coordinated control actions in the face of
intra-cluster network failures, instead of putting all devices
of the cluster immediately into their respective per-device
safety modes. Since medical services, e.g., airway-laser
surgery, still can be performed at SLclst and SLvclst lev-
els with little or no disruption, supporting two intermediate
open-loop safety levels is a great advantage for improving
effectiveness of medical services. In the meantime, the net-
work failure might be resolved, allowing the system to re-
cover to SLsys or SLclst levels.
4.2.1 Open-Loop Safety Mechanism
In our approach, the effectiveness under open-loop control
situations is provided by contingency plans. Contingency
plans consist of a set of coordinated future actions to be
taken by each device in the event of network failures. Our
system dynamically generates contingency plans from each
device’s contingency model. A contingency model MCd of
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a device d encodes the control behavior of the device under
open-loop control situations. For example, when an intra-
cluster network failure occurs, the contingency model of a
ventilator automatically resumes the oxygen supply in 4.5
minutes to prevent brain damage.
In our architecture, each cluster header is responsible for
generating instantiated contingency plans from component
devices’ contingency models. For instance, if a ventilator
requests blocking the oxygen supply at time tblcok, the clus-
ter header can make a contingency plan for the ventilator,
telling when the oxygen supply must resume. At the design
time of a cluster, the contingency models and physiological
models should be composed together and one should verify
whether they can actually generate safe and non-conflicting
contingency plans under open-loop control situations. In
Section 5, we discuss tool support for the composition and
verification of contingency models.
When two or more clusters must coordinate to guaran-
tee certain safety assertions, a control logic is placed on the
ICE supervisor. Currently, we only support the interlocking
pattern for inter-cluster coordination. For inter-cluster in-
terlocking, the same open-loop safety mechanism used for
clusters can be used again. However, instead of dealing with
device-specific models of underlying clusters, each cluster’s
contingency model related to the interlocking is expressed
in an abstract manner. Figure 4 shows the contingency mod-
els of the pulmonary cluster and the therapeutic cluster. The
pulmonary cluster is expressed as having two states, and all
nominal behaviors of the ventilator and the SpO2 monitor
are hidden in the Normal state. The laser device at the ther-
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apeutic cluster can stay at Enabled state as long as the pul-
monary cluster is not in Normal state. While in Enabled
state, the laser device can be both activated and deactivated
by physicians. Figure 5 shows an example of contingency
plans generated for the interlocked clusters. Once these
contingency plans are approved and delivered to respective
clusters at tblock, the laser device can be used during Tmaxlaser
time period even if a network failure occurs. Hence, the
airway laser surgery can still be performed without disrup-
tion within the time period. In the mean time, the network
failures might be resolved, transparently masking network
failures to operating physicians. Again, inter-cluster inter-
locking safety assertions should be verified at design time
using tools, as discussed in Section 5.
At runtime, whenever a device sends a request to change
its state, its cluster header or the ICE supervisor for inter-
locked clusters needs to update the contingency plans for
the devices before approving the request. This requires syn-
chronous and transactional updates of devices’ states for
consistency. This issue was addressed in our earlier NASS
protocol [12], and, hence, we omit the detailed mechanism
in this paper. Interested readers are referred to [12].
5 Tool Support for Design Principles
The design principles and supporting mechanisms are
embodied within the simulation and verification toolkit,
which is being implemented in MATLAB Simulink. The
toolkit enables clinical engineers to rapidly compose organ-
based clusters and hierarchical control structures to verify
both closed-loop and open-loop safety.
5.1 Components
As shown in Figure 6, the toolkit has 3 reusable compo-
nents: a set of medical device/cluster models, a set of organ-
specific physiological models, and verification patterns.
The device models are executable models that simulate
the control actions of devices. Each device has two control
models: one for modeling nominal control behavior under
closed-loop control, and the other for modeling contingency
control behavior under open-loop control. As discussed in
Section 4.2.1, the contingency behavior model of a device
is used by its cluster header or the ICE supervisor to gen-
erate contingency plans at runtime. Medical device manu-
facturers are supposed to provide device models. Currently,
all devices models are modeled using Stateflow charts of
Simulink.
(a) Interlock
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Figure 7. Verification patterns.
Holistic modeling of human physiology is a challenging
task, if not impossible. In our organ-based clustering ap-
proach, only organ-specific human physiology needs to be
modeled. For example, the saturated oxygen (SpO2) level
of a human body can be modeled as follows:
SpO2(k + 1) = SpO2(k) + (Ks +Kc)× δt, (1)
where Ks and Kc are the oxygen supply rate from the ven-
tilator 3 and the metabolic oxygen consumption rate of the
human body, respectively. Physiological models are used to
check the behavior of the clusters through simulations. Fur-
ther, the physiological models are also used by organ-based
clusters to generate contingency plans at runtime. Unlike
actual measurements from sensors, physiological models
have an effective time bound since the discrepancy between
the model and real physiological state grows over time if
not updated regularly. That is the reason why the safety
level SLvclst has a limited time bound. If a network failure
persists, all devices should be put into SLdev safety level
before the time bound. Clinical engineers are supposed to
provide these organ-based physiological models. Currently,
physiological models are modeled using Simulink Stateflow
charts and discrete transfer functions.
For formal specification of safety constraints, or asser-
tions, we provide verification patterns. Figure 7 shows two
3This is an abstraction that models the effects of the settings of FiO2
partial pressure, tidal volume, and breathing rate.
of them: interlock pattern and time bound (maximum) pat-
tern. The interlock pattern takes two signals, in1 and in2,
and verifies whether at most one of the signals is true. For
time bound pattern (maximum) pattern, a signal, in1 is al-
lowed to stay at one state for at most a specified time period.
In the airway laser surgery scenario, the interlock pattern
can be used to specify the interlocking between the laser de-
vice and the ventilator. The time bound (maximum) pattern
can be used to specify the maximum time bound for thresh-
old violation in the cardiac cluster and for oxygen blockage
time in the pulmonary cluster. The verification patterns are
being implemented using Simulink Design Verifier toolbox.
5.2 Verification of Safety
Once a cluster and its encapsulated safety constraints are
identified, its device models, physiological models, and in-
stantiated verification patterns are composed into a cluster
for verification. A cluster’s safety assertions should be veri-
fied both under closed-loop and open-loop conditions.
For closed-loop safety of a cluster, nominal behavior
models of devices are composed together with physiolog-
ical models to verify encapsulated safety constraints. For
instance, the pulmonary cluster should guarantee that brain
damage does not happen under closed-loop control situa-
tions. Due to space limitation, we omit the details of the
safety verification for closed-loop control systems. Inter-
ested readers are referred to [5].
As discussed in Section 4.2.1, a cluster header exploits
contingency models of its component devices and physio-
logical models to dynamically generate per-cluster contin-
gency plans for open-loop safety at runtime. Therefore,
these models should be composed together and one should
verify whether safety assertions can be guaranteed under
open-loop control situations. For the airway-laser surgery,
the following things are verified for safety constraints listed
in Table 1.
Pulmonary cluster: Figure 8-(a) shows the composed
pulmonary cluster to verify the safety assertions under open-
loop situations. In the figure, the 3rd input is open is the
trigger of an intra-cluster communication failure. For the
verification, all inputs of the composed system are left open
and the embedded model checker of Simulink checks all
possible state space. Safety constraints are shown on the
right side in Figure 8-(a). The safety assertion specified in
verify braindamage describes that the oxygen supply of the
ventilator should never be blocked for more than the speci-
fied time bound. This safety assertion is described using the
time bound(maximum) verification pattern. The only input
to the safety assertion is the state of the ventilator.
Cardiac cluster: The prevention of fluid overload is
achieved by detecting the duration of blood pressure and
heart rate threshold violations set by the attending physi-
cians. This safety assertion can be modeled using the time
(a) Pulmonary cluster
(b) Inter-cluster interlocking
Figure 8. Composition and verification for
open-loop safety.
bound(maximum) verification pattern. Because of the sim-
plicity of the solution and lack of space, we do not show the
verification in this paper.
Inter-cluster interlocking: For hierarchical composi-
tion of clusters, the same composition and verification
method used for individual clusters can be used. The only
difference is that the inter-cluster composition takes high-
level cluster models, not detailed device models, as inputs
for the composition and verification. High-level cluster
models, such as shown in Figure 4, are constructed ac-
cording to the verified properties of the clusters. Figure
8-(b) shows that the high-level cluster models of the pul-
monary cluster and the therapeutic cluster are composed for
the verification of the interlocking safety assertion. The ver-
ify interlock block in Figure 8-(b) takes the states of the pul-
monary cluster and the therapeutic cluster as inputs to check
if the interlocking property is guaranteed.
6 Evaluation of Effectiveness
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the pro-
posed design principles through a simulation study.
At SLvclst and SLdev safety levels, the effectiveness of
Table 3. Evaluated approaches
SY Sclstr Organ-based semi-autonomous clustering,
and contingency plans are supported
SY Snass No clustering, but supports contingency
plans for open-loop safety
SY Sbase Neither supports organ-based clustering
nor open-loop contingency plans
the medical service is limited because the devices should ei-
ther strictly follow contingency plans or stay at their default
safety modes. In particular, under SLdev safety level, mini-
mal safety is guaranteed, but medical procedures should be
stopped, significantly reducing the effectiveness of the med-
ical services. Therefore, we quantify the ineffectiveness of
networked medical devices as follows:
stay time at SLdev level
total execution time × 100(%), (2)
To determine the effectiveness of the proposed design
principles, we compare the behavior of our approach with
baseline approaches under various conditions, where a set
of parameters have been varied. We consider 3 approaches
shown in Table 3. In SY Sbase, all medical devices are di-
rectly plugged into a centralized supervisory device. Un-
der a communication failure at one or more devices, all
plugged-in devices transit into default per-device safety
modes, or SLdev, to prevent potential safety hazards. This
is a most straightforward implementation of the ICE stan-
dard. SY Snass is similar to SY Sbase, but devices have con-
tingency plans for communication failures. This approach
is similar to our previous NASS prototype [12]. Finally,
SY Sclstr is our approach, which has organ-based semi-
autonomous clusters and the hierarchical control structure.
Each cluster has per-cluster contingency plans for open-loop
safety.
We assume the airway-laser surgery scenario in-
troduced in Section 2. For SY Sclstr, 3 clusters
are assumed: pulmonary cluster CLSTpulm =
{ventilator, SpO2 sensor}, cardiac cluster CLSTcard =
{IV control, BP/HR monitor}, and therapeutic cluster
CLSTtherap = {laser}. The pulmonary cluster and the
therapeutic cluster are interlocked, and, hence, they transit
to SLvclst safety level together for open-loop safety. The
contingency plans are assumed valid for 60 seconds for the
pulmonary and therapeutic clusters. For the cardiac cluster,
the contingency plans are assumed valid for 30 seconds.
After those time bounds, the devices in the clusters, or ICE
supervisor, transit into default per-device safety mode. For
SY Snass, the validity of contingency plans is determined
by the minimum, which is the cardiac function, and, hence,
its contingency plans are valid for 30 seconds.
During the simulation, we introduce failures at commu-
nication links. The failures are independent and its inter-
arrival time follows an exponential distribution. Each fail-
ure is assumed to persist for a uniformly distributed time
period between 10 and 110 seconds. After the recovery of a
link, it takes an additional 5 seconds to make devices’ states
consistent.
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Figure 9. Effectiveness.
Figure 9 shows the results when the mean inter-arrival
time 1/λ of link failures is varied from 512 seconds to 4096
seconds. Figure 9-(a) shows that SY Sclstr is significantly
more effective than other approaches. For instance, when
1/λ is 512 seconds, SY Sbase and SY Snass stay at SLdev
for about 33% and 18% of the total time, respectively, due
to the communication failures. This implies that the surgery
should be stopped for a time, significantly reducing the ef-
fectiveness. In contrast, SY Sclstr stays at SLdev less than
1% of the total time. Since the pulmonary cluster and the
therapeutic clusters are interlocked, they stay at the same
safety levels. However, the cardiac cluster is independent
from other clusters, and, hence, the cluster has less than
0.04% stay time at SLdev safety level.
As the mean inter-arrival time of link failures increases,
the effectiveness improves in all approaches. However,
SY Sbase and SY Snass still have high percentages of stay
time at SLdev. For instance, when 1/λ is 4096 seconds,
the airway laser surgery should be stopped for 4.87% and
2.10% of the total time in SY Sbase and SY Snass, respec-
tively. In contrast, for SY Sclstr, the surgery is stopped only
for 0.17% of the total time.
Figure 9-(b) shows how long each approach stays at
SLvclst safety level. Under SLvclst, respective contingency
plans are executed to provide safety against link failures, but
the surgery is not stopped for the duration of the contingency
plans. If link failures are not resolved before the expiration
of the contingency plans, the system must transit into SLdev
safety level, reducing the effectiveness. Figure 9-(b) shows
that the stay times at SLvclst of SY Sclstr and SY Snass
are not significantly different. However, as shown in Figure
9-(a), the stay time at SLdev of SY Sclstr is significantly
smaller than SY Snass. This demonstrates that SY Sclstr
masks link failures more effectively than SY Snass. Since
each cluster of SY Sclstr is more independent from failures
at other clusters, it can recover to closed-loop safety lev-
els as soon as its local link failures are resolved. In contrast,
SY Snass cannot switch to closed-loop safety levels until all
communication links are recovered.
7 Related Work
Medical Device Plug-and-Play (MD PnP) aims to im-
prove the flexibility and interoperability of medical sys-
tems [8], and our work is part of that ongoing effort. Soft-
ware architectures for communications in medical plug-and-
play systems have been explored by King et. al. [13] using
publish-subscribe middleware. A meta-model for describ-
ing medical devices has been proposed by Hofmann to sup-
port the interoperability of legacy devices [10]. Until now,
however, much of the work for medical device interoper-
ability has focused on establishing dynamic connectivity of
devices, device-to-device synchronization, and ensuring fair
access to a communication medium. To the authors’ best
knowledge, our current work along with our previous work
[12] is the first addressing the open-loop safety issues for
collaborating medical devices.
Medical device safety has been a prevalent issue dat-
ing back to the infamous incidents of Therac 25 radiation
therapy machines [15]. Some mechanisms are used to im-
prove the accuracy and safety of the systems, such as fuzzy
logic [19], and information technology [7]. Arney et. al pro-
posed a closed-loop control design for patients’ safety using
patient-controlled analgesia (PCA) infusion pumps. In our
earlier work [12], we proposed Network-Aware Supervisory
System (NASS) framework [12]. NASS guarantees open-
loop safety by dynamically generating contingency plans for
plugged-in devices. In this work, we extend NASS to sup-
port organ-based semi-autonomous clustering and hierarchi-
cal control structure of networked medical devices. Through
a simulation study, we showed that this architectural sup-
port can make the implemented ICE systems more effec-
tive. Further, our approach supports model-based engineer-
ing using supporting tools. The tools enable rapid composi-
tion and verification of the proposed organ-based hierarchi-
cal ICE architecture.
Formal verification and validation of medical devices is a
critical issue for patient safety [14]. For one thing, the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) enforces a strict cer-
tification procedure for medical device approval [16]. For
another, formal methods are widely used in specifying and
verifying medical devices to improve safety and reliabil-
ity [2, 18, 11, 4]. However, much of the previous work fo-
cused on individual devices and did not address the safety
verification arising from coordination failures in networked
medical devices. In the current work, we aim to improve the
coordination safety and effectiveness for networked medi-
cal devices. The tools developed in Simulink enable mod-
ular verification of the proposed organ-based architecture.
In addition, once organ-based clusters are verified, they can
be used as building blocks for hierarchical composition of
networked medical devices.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed design principles and sup-
porting tools for safe and effective integration of net-
worked medical devices. The proposed organ-based semi-
autonomous and hierarchical control principle exploits
properties of human physiology to make an integrated med-
ical system more effective and resilient against communi-
cation failures. The modular structure of the proposed ar-
chitecture enables rapid composition of organ-based clus-
ters and the hierarchical verification of safety assertions.
Through a simulation study, we showed that the proposed
semi-autonomous hierarchical control structure can support
encapsulated safety properties while incurring significantly
smaller number of interruptions to ongoing medical ser-
vices, compared to baseline approaches.
Currently, our work only supports the interlocking pat-
tern for the hierarchical coordination of clusters. In the
future, we plan to extend our work to support more inter-
cluster coordination patterns. We also plan to apply the pro-
posed design principles to our NASS prototype.
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